National Parties and Group Membership in the European Parliament: Ideology or Pragmatism? by Bressanelli, Edoardo





This paper investigates the factors behind political Group membership in the European Parliament.  
At the beginning of each legislative term, political Groups are formally constituted. In June 2009,  
more than 150 national parties, from the 27 member countries of the EU, joined one of the seven  
transnational  groupings.  Two  main  explanations  of  Group  membership  are  advanced.  A  first,  
traditional argument for Group membership is based on the ideological or policy compatibility of  
the member parties within each political Group. National parties will join the political Group that  
best matches their programmatic position. A second argument focuses, instead, on the structure of  
incentives  in  the  European  Assembly,  positing  that  the  office  and pragmatic  goals  of  national  
parties are better advanced by joining the largest and most influential Groups. These arguments are  
tested  by  fitting  a  multinomial  logit  model  for  political  Group  'choice'  based  on  the  2009  
Euromanifestos  data.  The  findings  suggest  that  ideology  or  policy  compatibility  is  the  most  
important factor behind a party transnational affiliation. A note of caution is, however, warranted  
for the new members of Central and Eastern Europe, whose ideological fit in the political Groups  
appears to be more problematic than for West European parties.
Introduction
A few decades ago or so, it was customary for parties in the European People's Party to label 
themselves 'Christian-Democrats', while no national party in the Group of the Party of the European 
Socialists would omit from its official party label the word 'Socialist', 'Progressive', 'Labour', or 
some other variant. By simply scrolling down the list of the member parties of any political Group 
in  the  European Parliament  (EP) today,  and by looking at  their  names,  the  difference  is  quite 
starking. Thus, we discover that the 'Social Democrats' in Portugal sit with the EPP, after having 
been for a  short  time members  in  the Liberal  Group.  We can also find out  that  the Romanian 
Democratic Liberal Party is, rather, a member of the EPP, or that the Italian Democrats – once led 
by the left-wing Christian-Democrat and former Commission President Romano Prodi – are allies 
with the Socialists. These few illustrations should make evident the reason why an experienced 
practitioner in the EU has described the EP Groups as close to “catch-all parties”, whose member 
parties follow the maxim “let us enlarge the Group to control the Parliament, let us get membership 
in the Group to get the key positions in the House” (Gozi, 2003:1126). 
On the other  hand, however,  what  we know is that the political  Groups are remarkably 
cohesive, and that their voting cohesion – as measured via roll-call votes – has actually increased 
1 European University Institute, Florence. edoardo.bressanelli@eui.eu 
1
with time, despite the different waves of enlargement of the European Union (Hix  et al., 2007). 
What is more, anedoctal evidence suggests that the national parties are far from indifferent to the 
policy priorities and the ideological profile of the Group where they seek membership. For instance, 
the internal divisions of the British Conservatives about membership in the pro-European EPP are 
well  known,  and the  recent  critics  of  some high-ranking  Italian  Democrats  about  their  party's 
alliance with the European Socialists – on the ground that they are democratic, not socialist – show 
that traditional labels and ideological ties are likely to have some effect upon a party transnational 
affiliation.  Hence,  this  paper  aims  to  provide  a  systematic  assessment  about  the  nature  of  the 
political Groups in the EP, by investigating the factors behind national party membership. In short,  
it is asked: what drives the national parties to affiliate with a political Groups in the EP? Is the 
choice  of  membership  driven  by pragmatism and  office  incentives,  by  policy  and  ideological 
affinities, or a mixture of the two? 
Substantively, an answer to this question is warranted for at least three reasons. First and 
foremost, it says a great deal about the nature and the prospects of political parties in the EU. If the 
Groups  are  broad  aggregations  of  heterogenous  parties,  their  parliamentary  function  can  be 
guaranteed by disciplinary mechanisms,  or  by other  institutional  devices to  build up consensus 
among  their  Members.  However,  being  it  the  case,  it  is  very  unlikely  that  any  meaningful 
transnational party cooperation beyond the parliamentary arena will be achieved. In other words, it 
is hard to imagine genuine Europarties invested by a representative function, capable to campaign 
on common programmatic bases across the EU-27.2 Second, by investigating the composition of the 
Groups in the new enlarged EU we assess its capacity to integrate the new Central and Eastern 
members. Assuming that the Groups in the EU-15 are based on the traditional familles spirituelles, 
several observers questioned the ideological fit of the new parties from the post-communist states. 
Thirdly,  on a more general level,  by studying the policy/ideological profile of the transnational 
Group  we  are  inevitably  confronted  with  the  broad  question  of  the  parties  programmatic 
convergence and the (failing?) role of parties as representative agents in modern democracies.
With respect to the existing literature, this work seeks to address the plea for “a systematic 
attempt at  explaining national parties’ choice of group membership” (Maurer  et al.,  2008:246). 
Until  recently,  the  question  of  group  membership  has  been  only  addressed  through  anecdotal 
evidence or, focusing on the UK Conservative party, with historical narratives and process tracing 
(Johansson, 1997; Lynch, Whitaker, 2008; Maurer et al., 2008). In the last few years, a number of 
2 The Treaty of Lisbon states: “The functioning of the Union shall be founded on representative democracy” (art. 
10.1) and “political parties at European level contribute […] to expressing the will of the citizens of the Union” (art. 
10.4). Furthermore, a proposal to reform the 1976 Electoral Act by MEP Duff suggests the introduction of an 
additional EU-wide constituency, from which 25 MEPs would be elected on transnational lists. These institutional 
changes seem to favour the consolidation of the extra-parliamentary parties (see Bardi et al., 2010)
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studies has begun to fill in this lacuna (Klingemann et al., 2007:27-56; Hoyland, Godbout, 2008). 
The most recent and refined study on the topic, based on expert survey data, is due to McElroy and 
Benoit who, in presenting their own work, significantly note: “[group membership] exact working 
remains largely unstudied” (2010:377).
This paper aims at contributing to this growing literature by fitting a predictive model of 
Group membership for the 140 national parties gaining representation in the 2009 EP issueing their 
own Euromanifesto. The Euromanifesto data, collected by the Euromanifesto Project (PIREDEU, 
European University Institute) for the latest EP elections, seem to be particularly apt to address our 
research goals. Because the Euromanifestos have been collected in 2009, they allow us to include in 
the  analysis  all  the  Member  countries  of  the  EU-27 and  most  of  their  parties.  Moreover,  and 
substantially,  the  Euromanifestos  can  be  considered  as  the  most  authoritative  documents, 
specifically produced for  the  EU arena  by the party central  office,  where the party defines  its 
general objectives and policy goals. 
The rest of this paper is structured as follows. Section II provides background information 
on the political Groups in the 2009-2014 EP. Section III presents two alternative arguments on 
Group membership: a first  based on ideology or policy compatibility,  a second on instrumental 
incentives and office spoils. Section IV introduces the operationalization of the variables. Section V 
investigates the factors behind Group membership using a statistical analysis.  Finally, Section VI 
concludes. 
2. Background: the Political Groups in the European Parliament
In June 2009, the seventh round of direct elections for the European Parliament was held. Shortly 
afterwards, the political Groups were formally constituted (table 1). The outcome of the elections – 
the  first  in  the  EU-27 –  was  positive  for  the  European People's  Party (EPP),  reconfirming  its 
leadership in the Chamber with 265 seats. The Socialists could not be fully satisfied by the results – 
which granted them only 184 seats, despite the alliance with the Italian Democrats (hence the new 
label: Socialists & Democrats). As in previous legislatures, the third Group in terms of seats was the 
Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe (ALDE), with 84 members.
Electoral results were rewarding for the Greens – European Free Alliance (EFA), which performed 
better than expected in several Member countries. On the extreme left, the European United Left 
(GUE) achieved 35 seats.  Two new Groups were also constituted.  The British Conservatives – 
together with the Czech Civic Democratic Party and the Polish Law and Justice – left the People's  
Party and constituted the European Conservatives and Reformists Group (ECR). The British UKIP 
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and the Italian Northern League, together with seven other small parties, formed the Europe for 
Freedom and Democracy (EFD). 
Table 1: the political Groups in June 2009 
Political Group MEPs Member Parties Countries
European People's Party (EPP) 265 41 26
Progressive Alliance of Socialists and 
Democrats (S&D)
184 29 27
Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe 
(ALDE)
84 28 18
The Greens – European Free Alliance
(Greens-EFA)
55 19 14
European United Left – Nordic Green Left 
(GUE-NGL)
35 15 14
European Conservatives and Reformists Group 
(ECR)
54 8 8
Europe of Freedom and Democracy (EFD) 30 9 9
Non-Attached 28 12 9
Source: www.europarl.europa.eu 
The political Groups are formally reconstituted at the beginning of each parliamentary term. The 
formal rules of the EP set two conditions for a political Group to be recognised as such. In the new 
(June  2009)  edition  of  the  parliamentary  regulations,  Rule  30  states:  “members  may  form 
themselves into groups according to their political affinities” and “a political group shall comprise 
Members elected in at least one-quarter of the Member States. The minimum number of Members 
required to form a political group shall be 25”. 
The latter is simply a numerical criterion. A political Group cannot fall below twenty-five Members 
and has to include at least seven Member Countries. With the enlargements of the EC/EU and the 
inclusion  of  more  and  more  members,  the  numerical  criterion  has  progressively become more 
demanding,  with  the  purpose  of  avoiding  a  too  high  fragmentation  of  the  parliamentary  party 
system.3
The criterion of 'political affinities'  is,  instead, somewhat more vague and needs to be carefully 
interpreted. In June 1953 already, the Rules of Procedure of the Coal and Steel Community formally 
recognised that political Groups could be formed according to “political persuasion”. When it was 
3 For instance, the 2003 version of the Rules of Procedure (15 th ed.) only stated: 'A political group must comprise 
Members from more than one Member State. The minimum number of Members required to form a political group shall 
be twenty-three if they come from two Member States, eighteen if they come from three Member States and fourteen if 
they come from four or more Member States' (Rule 29.2)
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first introduced, this requirement was meant to prevent the formation of national groupings. In the 
early  days  of  European  integration,  it  was  broadly  felt  that  the  organisation  of  the  Common 
Assembly  in  national  groupings  was  fundamentally  anti-European.  Hence,  political  persuasion, 
rather than nationality, was recognised as the the 'glue' sticking the deputies together. 
Nevertheless, the formation of such a group as the 'Technical Group for the Defence of Independent 
Members',  constituted in 1979 by the Italian radicals,  some communist  parties,  the Eurosceptic 
Danes, and Belgian and Irish independents, seems to defy the formal rules. What are the common 
ideological ties binding together in a Group MEPs officially declaring, in the act of constitution: 
‘each member of the Group keeps its own political programme, its freedom of speech and of voting 
both in committees and in the plenary’?
There is indeed one case, in the history of the EP, when a political Group was actually dissolved. It 
occurred  in  1999,  when  the  'Technical  Group  for  Non-Attached  Members  –  Mixed  Group', 
constituted by deputies of very diverse political backgrounds, from the Italian Radicals to Le Pen’s 
Front National, was dissolved after a ruling of the European Court of Justice. This decision, the first 
and only one in the sixty years of existence of the EP, was justified on the grounds that the Group 
explicitly denied in its constitutive declaration the pre-requisite of political affinities. 
This decision signals that the requirement of political affinities has a purely negative connotation: in 
other words, it only indicates when an aggregation of parties is not a political Group.  Hence, from a 
formal reading of the parliamentary Rules of Procedure, a ‘political Group’  can only be defined as 
‘a  (sufficiently  large)  set  of  deputies  who  do  not  explicitly  refute  political  affinities  among 
themselves when deciding to form a Group’ (Settembri, 2004:168).
3. Explaining Group Membership: Ideology or Pragmatism?
As shown above, the formal Rules of the EP do not set too strict criteria for the formation of the 
political Groups. As the quantitative criterion is achieved, national parties willing to constitute a 
political Group do not have too worry about 'political affinities', insofar as they do not explicitly 
deny  them.  Hence,  it  shall  not  be  taken  for  granted  that  the  choice  to  seek  membership,  or  
constitute,  a  political  Group is  driven by the ideological or policy compatibility of its  member 
parties. As the formation of a 'Technical Group' shows, national parties might decide to associate 
with  other  parties  only  to  enjoy  procedural  and  organizational  advantages.  As  seating  in  the 
Chamber  as  Non-Attached  penalizes  parties  in  several  important  respects,4 being  in  a  political 
4 Non-attached members do not have voting rights in the Conference of the Presidents, the Parliament executive organ; 
they are allocated a residual fraction of the speaking time in the plenary; they are rarely allocated important reports and,  
as to symbolically represent their minor role, they sit at the very back of the hemycycle.
5
Groups might be convenient in terms of influence and ressources, but might have little – if anything 
– to do with ideology. 
In what follows, I will present two different arguments about political Group membership. For a 
first  argument,  what  counts  most  is  the  ideological  or  policy affinity  with the  other  members. 
National  parties  will  choose  the  political  Group that  best  matches  their  ideological  position or 
policy preferences. For a second argument, national parties are mostly guided by the pursuit of 
office  goals  and pragmatic  objectives.  The institutional  rules  of  the  EP grant  more  power  and 
ressources to the large political Groups. National parties can hardly attain any office goals if not as 
members of a political Group, and large governing parties will have strong incentives to enter the 
EPP or the S&D. Both arguments are presented in more details below.
Ideology or Programmatic Affinities
The traditional explanation for Group membership is based on the ideological compatibility of the 
member parties within each political Group, granted by the common cleavages upon which the West 
European party systems originated. Thomassen and Schmitt have repeteadly  emphasized in their 
works that a EU party system can only be 'feasible' if the major lines of political conflict in Europe 
do not coincide with the national borders but, rather, cross-cut national distinctions (2004, 2009). 
The formation of the political Groups is traditionally described by a reading of European politics 
based  upon a  few fundamental  social  cleavages,  which  had been 'activated'  and interpreted  by 
political actors in a roughly similar fashion throughout Western Europe.  The social  cleavages – 
between agriculture and labour, the church and the state, the centre and the periphery, the industrial 
workers and the owners of  the capital  (Lipset,  Rokkan, 1967) – 'produced'  competing political 
parties, which could be grouped in distinct party families (and political Groups) according to the 
social groups they represent and the basic ideological principles they follow. 
A 'party family' explanation of national parties' transnational affilation is to be found in several early 
studies of the EU party system and its units (Van Oudenhove, 1965; Marquand, 1978; Von Beyme, 
1985). Additionally, several recent scholarly contributions point to the enduring validity of ideology 
or  policy-based  arguments.  For  instance,  Klingemann  and  colleagues,  basing  their  analysis  on 
national election manifestos, test whether the political Groups “have a strong basis in the old party 
families and hence are grounded in their policies and ideologies” (2007:28). From the results of a 
discriminant  analysis,  they  conclude  that:  “the  success  of  our  classifications  demonstrates  the 
programmatic coherence of the European groupings” (39). 
A similar conclusion is also reached by the study of the MEPs' ideal points, as estimated from the 
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scaling of roll-call votes. As Hix and colleagues strongly put it: “politics in the European Parliament 
is very much like politics in  other democratic parliaments, dominated by left-right positions and 
driven by the  traditional  party families  of  domestic  European politics”  (2007:181).  The voting 
behaviour  of  the  MEPs  would  be  largely  determined  by  domestic  party  preferences,  and  the 
relatively high voting cohesion of the political Groups would be, at least partly, explained by the 
similar ideological preferences of their members. 
Finally, drawing from their own expert survey data, McElroy and Benoit test the hypothesis that 
“the  fundamental  driving  force  behind  national  party  affiliation  in  EP party  groups  is  policy 
congruence:  national  political  parties  will  seek  membership  in  EP party  groups  whose  policy 
platforms are closest to their own, on their most important national policy dimensions” (2010:377). 
The results  of  their  sophisticated  empirical  analysis  confirm their  expectation,  leading them to 
conclude that “Party groups at the transnational level not only operate in a similar policy space as 
do national parties, but also tend to be formed mainly as coalitions of parties that are like-minded on 
matters of policy” (396). Although McElroy and Benoit explicitly challenge the validity of 'party 
family' explanations, the observational implications of their study do not appear too different from 
Klingemann's work, rooted in a more traditional framework.5 
Pragmatism and Office Spoils
An alternative argument posits that the Groups are broad coalitions of national parties, where the 
programmatic convergence – not to say the identity – of the members is very loose. As Fabbrini 
puts it: “Groups have progressively become mere coalitions of national parties with the objective to 
coordinate the national representatives on specific policies. Differences within each of the Groups 
are so starking that the label of 'party' is, in most of the cases, wholly instrumental” (2003:9-10). A 
similar  picture  is  also  made  by  the  then  Secretary-General  of  the  European  People's  Party: 
“moderates on the Left/Centre-Left are progressively gathering together under the umbrella of the 
PES,  and  those  of  the  Right/Centre-Right  under  that  of  the  EPP.  […]  On  the  agenda  is  the 
development of people’s parties that are essentially free of ideology (Jansen, 2006:55). 
5 McElroy and Benoit's critique on the use of the concept of 'party family' to study political Group affiliation is based 
on three aspects. First, it provides a “static” picture, while transnational affiliation is a dynamic process. Second, the 
'party family' concept is difficult to apply to Central and Eastern Europe and to single-issue parties. Third, 'party 
family' categories provide low information, being categorical in nature (2010:382-3). On a conceptual level, the first 
point seems disputable. 'Party families' do change over time. For instance, the Socialist family of the Sixties, 
traditionally Marxist, is very different from the Socialist family of today, embracing a social-market economy. 
Empirically, the third point raised by McElroy and Benoit seems to capture a mode of operationalizing 'party family' 
based on party origin or sociology.  An alternative operalization, however critizable on its own grounds, is indeed 
based on “the congruence of the policies and/or ideologies that are professed or even pursued by the parties” as 
estimated from expert surveys, voting behaviour, manifestos and other data (Mair, Mudde, 1998:217). 
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The  roots  of  this  development  are  located  in  the  broader  context  of  the  ideological/policy 
convergence of political parties (Volkens, 2006) and the affirmation of the cartel party model (Katz,  
Mair, 1995). Furthermore, rationalist-choice studies place their focus on the important role played 
by the structure of incentives which the national parties are confronted with when they enter the 
Parliament (Gozi, 2003; Maurer et al., 2008). In extreme synthesis, it is argued that the larger the 
Group is, the more financial and administrative ressources, key committees and legislative reports 
obtains and it is able to distribute among its members.
Indeed, both the supply-side - the political Groups – and the demand-side – the candidate parties – 
face strong instrumental or self-interested incentives to, respectively, include more members and 
seeking membership in the existing Groups. For the latter, a 'marriage of convenience' is rewarding 
both in terms of office positions and influence in the European Parliament. By joining an existing 
Group, parties enjoy the advantage of having a large bureaucratic apparatus at their disposal, with 
an  experienced  staff  and  substantial  financial  ressources  they  can  draw on.  In  particular,  it  is 
crucially important for the governing parties – “parties with a majoritarian vocation” (Fabbrini, 
2006:9) – to get membership in either the EPP or the S&D: several rules in the EP reward the larger, 
penalizing the smaller Groups.
To start with, votes in the Conference of Presidents are weighted for the number of MEPs, thus 
favouring  the  largest  Groups  in  all  important  decisions  over  the  EP legislative  planning  and 
organization (Rule 24). Furthermore, the D'Hondt method is generally employed for the distribution 
of office positions. Albeit in the family of proportional formulas, it tends to better reward the largest 
parties. Hence, when committee or inter-parliamentary delegation chairmanships are distributed, all 
the most coveted positions are assigned to the largest Groups. As illustrated by Corbett  et al.: “in 
2004, for example, the EPP-ED group had the right to the first, third, fifth, seventh, ninth, twelfth, 
seventeenth, nineteenth ad twenty-first choice, the Socialists to the second, fourth, eighth, tenth, 
sixteenth,  twentieth  and  twenty-second  choices  […]  the  UEN  to  the  twenty-fourth  choice” 
(2007:130).
Finally, the distribution of legislative reports in Committees is, also, generally based on a points 
system favouring the largest political Groups. It has been shown that “the auction-like points system 
means that only the PES and the EPP can normally afford the most expensive reports” and that 
thelargest  political  groups  are  “over-represented”  in  the  share  of  reports  they get  (Mamadouh, 
Raunio,  2003:346-347).  Although not  all  the  committees  apply the  D'Hondt  system,  and other 
considerations  sometimes  matter  (such  as  a  the  Member's  seniority  or  his/her  technical 
competences), only two minor Committees – Petition and Budgetary Control – do not apply any 
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points system at all (European Parliament, 2009). 
On  the  other  hand,  the  political  Groups  have  equally  powerful  incentives  to  expand  their 
membership, without being too strict on ideological compatibility. According to the Regulation on 
political parties at European level,6 the quota of financial ressources the extra-parliamentary parties 
get is strictly propotional to their number of seats it has in the Parliament.7 Failure to include large 
national parties might then lead to a relevant drain in ressources. 
Moreover,  financial  advantages  are  not  only  indirect.  The  parameters  for  the  distribution  of 
ressources among the political Groups are based on both their size (the sheer number of Members) 
and their diversity (the number of Countries). Consequently, the larger and more diverse the Group 
is, the more staff and financial ressources it will get. Again, failure to include large parties might 
substantially weaken a Group vis-a-vis its competitors in the EP. 
The instrumental incentives for Group membership are likely to be particularly strong for 'new' 
parties, which have been only marginally exposed to the practices of transnational party cooperation 
and, as in the case of the parties of the post-communist region, do not often represent clear-cut 
social cleavages as their Western counterparts, at least historically, did.8 Indeed, in their study on 
Group affiliation, based on the MEPs' speeches in the plenary, Hoyland and Godbout conclude: “the 
parties from the new member states were all but guided by ideology or similarity in belief system 
with parties from the old member states in their choice of party group affiliation” (2008:2). Whereas 
in their study on party families in Eastern Europe, Hlousek and Kopecek note that “many parties 
aspire to membership in this or that established supranational party structure for pragmatic tactical 
reasons  rather  than  political  self-identification:  it  is  simply  advantageous  for  them”  (2010:11) 
pointing – among others – to the manifest cases of the SMER Party in Slovakia and the Freedom 
Union in Poland.9
6 Regulation (EC) No 2004/2003 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 4 November 2003 on the regulations 
governing political parties at European level and the rules regarding their funding, Official Journal, L 297, 15.11.2003, 
p.  1-4 and  Regulation (EC)  No 1524/2007 of  the European Parliament  and of the Council  of  18 December 2007 
amending Regulation (EC) No 2004/2003, Official Journal, L 343, 27.12.2007, p. 5–8.
7 Art. 10 of Reg. 2004/2003 reads: “Available appropriations shall be distributed annually as follows among the political  
parties at European level which have obtained a positive decision on their application for funding as referred to in 
Article 4: (a) 15 % shall be distributed in equal shares; (b) 85 % shall be distributed among those which have elected  
members in the European Parliament, in proportion to the number of elected members”
8 Moreover, for Central and Eastern Europe parties, transnational affiliation also represented an important source of 
legitimacy 'at home'. For parties without long political biographies, membership in a particulat Europarty could be a 
card to  be played  against  competitors.  When several  parties  are competing to  occupy the same ideological  space,  
Europarty membership could offer a significant competitive advantage.
9 SMER was granted provisional membership of the PES only in 2005 and it was suspended from October 2006 to 
February 2008, having entered a government coalition with the extreme nationalists of the SNS party. 
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Additionally, the relevance of pragmatic incentives for Group membership has been well illustrated 
for the case of the British Conservative Party, whose alliance with the EPP has been defined as a 
“loveless marriage” (Lynch, Whitaker, 2008) or a “marriage of convenience” (Maurer et al., 2008). 
Despite some differences on socioeconomic policies and, more manifestly, on European Integration, 
the Tories have been members of the EPP – European Democrats from 1994 to 2009. Searching for 
the motives behind the alliance, Johansson reports some revealing comments by the Tory MEPs: the 
alliance “would give the Conservative far more clout”; “influence is magnified by being part of a 
larger family”; if isolated the Tories would be “without influence” (1997:146-148).
A less studied case is that of the Italian Democrats. The party was born in 2007 as a merger of the 
former  Communists  and  left-wing  Christian-Democrats,  but  its  MEPs  continued  to  sit  in  two 
different Groups, the PES and the ALDE, in the 2004-2009 Parliament.  The question of which 
political Group the PD should choose in the 2009-2014 Parliament had been very divisive within 
the party and all the available options were considered. As the discussion in the party unfolded, 
however, both the idea to create a new 'federalist' Group and to join the Non-Attached were ruled 
out. As several party members declared, both alternatives would have implied a “loss of influence”, 
leaving “the party isolated in Europe” (interviews, 25-01-10; 06-02-10). The PD, finally, chose the 
Socialists, constituting the new Socialists  and Democrats  alliance – where the Democrats are the 
Italian delegation only.
4. Data and Methods
The data used to estimate the ideology or policy position of the national parties, and empirically test 
the argument that Group membership is driven by the ideological compatibility of their members, 
are the Euromanifestos issued by the national parties for the 2009 European Parliament elections. 
Euromanifestos were collected and coded by the the Euromanifesto Project (EMP), now part of the 
broader  European  Election  Study 2009 (www.piredeu.eu).  The theoreotical  and methodological 
foundations of the EMP lie in the Comparative Manifestos Project (see,  inter alia, Budge  et al., 
2001). In order to transform the Euromanifesto text into numbers, each unit of analysis – a 'quasi-
sentence', representing the verbal expression of one political idea or issue –  is placed under a policy 
category defined by the coding dictionary. In the 2009 version of the EMP, categories have been 
recasted  in  a  hierarchical  manner.  Each  category  first  identifies  the  policy  issue  (ie.  'state 
involvement in the economy'), only then the coder decides whether the statement has positive or 
negative connotation (Braun  et al., 2010:17-18). Hence, pure 'valence' issues are coded in a first 
step. In a second, the party position with respect to each policy category is captured.
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As in the CMP, individual policy categories can be aggregated to compute policy scales where 
political parties can be convenientely located. Two policy dimensions are commonly regarded as 
sufficient to provide a parsimonious, yet accurate, representation of the ideological space occupied 
by the political Groups: a left-right and a sovereignty-integration dimension (Hix et al., 2007:161-
165). The computation of the former is based on a slightly modified version of the original CMP 
scale, including new sub-categories (Budge et al., 2001:22-25, Braun et al., 2010:56). The latter is, 
instead,  computed  by  subtracting  positive  to  negative  categories  on  European  institutions  and 
policies (Braun et al., 2010:56).
In order to provide a more fine-grained representation of party positions, and to make a fuller use of 
the information contained in the Euromanifestos,  four additional relevant scales have also been 
computed.10 Drawing on Lowe  et  al.  (2008) on the  computation of  specific  policy scales  with 
manifesto data, and checking the covariation of categories with confirmatory factor analysis, we 
computed  policy  scales  on  market  economy,  welfare  expansion,  environment and  liberal-
conservatism.11 
Furthermore, to empirically test the argument that Group membership is driven by office rewards 
and pragmatism, we computed the variable size as the  vote share of the party in the closest national 
election  ahead the  2009 elections  to  the  European Parliament,  obtaining  electoral  figures  from 
http://www.parties-and-elections.de (see McElroy, Benoit, 2010:388). What we are able to test is, 
specifically, whether large parties ('parties with majoritarian vocation') are more likely to enter the 
largest political Groups, ceteris paribus. 
Our dependent variable is constituted by seven categories – the seven political Groups formed at the 
beginning of the 2009-2014 European Parliament (table 2). Because of the qualitative, categorical 
nature of  the  dependent  variable,  we fitted a  multinomial  logit  model  on the  140 observations 
(national  parties)  for which we have full  non-missing data.12 The multinomial  logit  model  is  a 
simple extension of the logit model, presenting a series of binary comparisons between the outcome 
categories of the dependent variable. Hence, when J categories constitute the outcome, J – 1 binary 
logits need to be estimated.
10 The selection of this scales is based on two criteria. First, such scales are included and, as a consequence, regarded 
as important, in most of the studies on Europarties positions and differences (Klingemann et al., 2007:29-56; 
McElroy, Benoit, 2007; Trechsel, Mair, 2009). Second, a descriptive analysis of the Euromanifestos reveals that the 
selected scales capture the most salient issues for the parties.
11 Scales on market economy, environment and liberal-conservatism are 'confrontational', that is computed by 
subtrating opposing categories. The scale on welfare is 'additive' and is computed as the sum of pro-welfare 
categories. On 'confrontational' vs 'additive' scales, Klingemann et al., 2007:114.
12  Very few parties do not issue a proper Euromanifesto. When this is the case, the EMP has searched for a a 
substitute, such as the European ‘chapter’ of the national election platform. For the analysis, leaders declarations and 
short flyers have not been considered to be proper substitutes. Being very succint documents, they return extreme 
and implausible estimates (see Gabel, Huber, 2000:100)
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Table 2: Dependent variable: non-missing observations 
Political Group Freq. Percent Cum. Percent
EPP 40 28.57 27.97
S&D 26 18.57 47.14
ALDE 27 19.29 66.43
Greens-EFA 18 12.86 79.29
GUE-NGL 15 10.71 90.00
ECR 7 5 95.00
EFD 7 5 100
   Tot 140 100
Logit models  predict the probability of a certain outcome occurring – in our case, the choice of 
group j over group ji - given the values of the explanatory variables. The regression coefficients, 
estimated by maximum-likelihood, indicate whether the explanatory variables increase or decrease 
the probability of the outcome occurring. 
Because of non-linearity, we follow a standard practice by reporting odds ratios (eβ), rather than the 
β coefficients. Odds ratios provide a more intuitive interpretation of the effect of each regressor: for 
a unit change in xi, the odds of y=1 change by a factor of eβ, holding all other variables constant. 
Odds ratios with values between 0 and 1 point to a negative effect (the probability of choosing 
group j over group ji , decreases) whereas odds ratios greater than 1 indicate a positive effect. 
Multinomial logit models can also be usefully employed as classification tools. The parameters of 
the  model  are  estimated  as  to  maximise  the  probability  of  observing  the  selected  sample. 
Predictions for each observations are then computed, and probabilities assigned to each national 
party  to  fall  in  each  outcome  category.  To  ease  interpretation,  a table  featuring  observed  vs 
predicted  probabilities  is  regarded  as  a  most  effective  way  to  synthetically  display  the  many 
comparisons involved in multinomial logit (Long, Freese, 2006:157-158).
There are two main aspects – beside the data – distinguishing this analysis from similar exercises in 
the literature. Differently from Klingemann  et al. (2007:29-51), we select our scales deductively, 
rather than computing linear combinations from the data and then provide an ex post interpretation 
of their meaning. Indeed, although multinomial logit and discriminant analysis can both be used to 
classify observations into groups,  the latter  presents the advantage of selecting the variables of 
interest out of theoretical considerations, rather than letting the data 'speak for themselves'. 
Differently from McElroy and Benoit (2010), we use multinomial, rather than conditional logit. The 
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main difference between the two models is that the latter also incorporates information on 'choice-
level' variables. In other words, not only characteristics of the individual-level, but also features of 
the  choice-level  variable  (the  political  Groups)  inform  the  model.  Despite  its  attractiveness, 
conditional logit has not been used here because, as to get information on the ideological position of 
the Groups, we would have needed to rely on the Europarty Euromanifestos. However, not only 
they  are  considerably  shorter  than  the  national  party  manifestos,  but  they  are  also  commonly 
regarded as lacking substantive policy content (Roa Bastos, 2009). 
In what follows, we make three different estimates of Group membership. First, we build a simple 
model (Model 1) where only the left-right and the anti-pro EU integration scales are entered. These 
variables should suffice to capture the fundamental ideological differences between the political 
Groups, if the Groups are grounded on the common ideologies of their members. In Model 2, we 
further include the variable  size,  as to capture the pragmatic and office-driven motivations of the 
parties. Finally, Model 3 takes into account the complexity of the ideological profile of the political  
Groups including, as predictors, further dimensions on market economy, welfare expansion, liberal-
conservatism and  environment. This last model is used to compute the predicted probabilities for 
each national party to be member of each political Group.
5. Results
Model1 reveals that ideology is  a strong predictor of Group membership in the EU-27. A unit 
change in the left-right scale makes a national party more likely by a factor of 1.11 to join the EPP 
rather than than the S&D (p<.01) and less likely by a factor of .93 (p<.01) to enter the S&D rather  
than the ALDE (chosen as comparison category). Coefficients for the variable left-right are also 
significant when the ALDE is compared with the Groups located on its left: a unit move towards the 
right makes a party less likely to enter the ALDE by a factor of .95 vis-a-vis the Greens and by a 
factor of .84 with respect to the GUE (p<.01). Furthermore, there is a large and highly significant 
coefficient when the S&D – EPP comparison is made. 
By contrast, the left-right dimension weakly distinguishes the ALDE from the Groups located on its 
right. In the binary comparisons with the ECR and the EFD, the anti-pro integration dimension is 
far more important. Both Groups are considerably less supportive of the EU integration process 
than the ALDE. Ceteris paribus, a unit increase in the support for integration makes a national party 
less likely to join the ECR by a factor of .84 and the EFD by a factor of .7 (both significant at .01).  
Furthermore, it shall be noted that the ALDE and the GUE-NGL are also clearly distinguished in 
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their support for EU integration. 
However, ideology is not sufficient to fully account for the composition of the political Groups. 
Indeed, in Model 2, the variable size is also highly significant (p<.01) for the ALDE/EPP, the ALDE 
/S&D and the ALDE/Greens comparisons. The odds-ratios are positive in the former two cases: a 
unit increase in size, controlling for the party position, makes a national party 1.08 and 1.12 times  
more likely to join, respectively, the EPP and the S&D rather than the ALDE. Moreover, it is worth 
noticing that size has an effect also in the 'choice' between medium-size and small political Groups. 
Controlling for ideological position, as national parties get bigger, they are more likely to join the 
ALDE rather than the Greens.
A likelihood ratio test has been made between model 1 (a reduced model) and model 2 to formally 
test  if  the  variable  size makes  a  relevant  contribution.  The  results  confirm that  size  improves 
significantly (p<.01) the fit of the model. Indeed, the pseudo R2  increases by about eleven percent, 
moving from .26 in Model 1 to .37 in Model 2. 
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In order to better capture the specific effect of left-right on Group membership, it is useful to graph 
its effect by keeping the other variables constant at some specified value. Hence, in Graph 1, we 
show the probability for a national party to join each political Group as its position on the left-right 
dimension is allowed to vary and the other variables – its position on European integration and size 
– are kept constant at their mean value. 
The key to interpret the graph is to look at the differences between shaded areas. Moving up from 
the x-axis, the dark grey area represents the predicted probabilities of joining the S&D. Together 
with the bordering shaded area – coloured in lighter grey – they represent the summed probability 
that a national party will join either the S&D or the ALDE – as its position on left-right varies. 
Finally,  the difference between the two areas can be read as the probability to enter the ALDE 
Group.
As  it  can  clearly  be  seen,  as  a  party  moves  from  left  to  right  its  options  for  transnational 
membership change dramatically. The more right-wing a party is, the bigger its chances to join the 
EPP or the ECR. On the other hand, the more left-wing a party is, the more likely it is to associate 
with the GUE or the S&D. Towards the centre of the left-right spectrum, the ALDE and the EPP 
become the most likely choice. Overall, differences in the left-right position of the national parties 
clearly matter in the choice between the political Groups. When all the national parties are pooled 
together, we obtain a rather traditional representation of the EP ideological space in the EU-27 – 
with the political Groups neatly differentiated for their position on the left-right dimension.
Graph 1: Predicted probabily plot: effect of left-right on Group membership























Based again on Model 2, Graph 2 below shows, instead, the effect of the variable size, keeping the 
other independent variables at their mean-values. The graph compares the probability of joining a 
large group (either the S&D or the EPP) vs a middle-size group (the ALDE) as the national parties 
grow in size. In both cases, it can be observed that the Liberals seem to be a less attractive option 
for large national parties. Differently said, as far as a party gets supported by less than ten percent of 
the voters,  ceteris  paribus  it  is  more likely to  join the Liberals.  In contrast,  as the 10 percent 
'threshold' is overcome, the EPP or the S&D appear to be more rewarding alternatives. 
Graph 2: Variations in Size and Effect on Group Membership
Note: n=140. Other variables kept at their mean-values
Looking at the estimates of Model 1 and Model 2, both ideology and pragmatism seem to matter for 
national parties' Group membership. True, size accounts for a lesser proportion of the explained 
variance, but this is hardly the final word on the matter. However, before tackling this point further 
in the following section, it worth focusing on Western and Eastern Europe separately. Two separate 
models have been run for the two sub-groups. Due to the low number of parties in the smaller  
political Groups in Eastern Europe, the number of outcome categories has been reduced to three. In 
other words, we only estimate the probabilities of joining the S&D, the ALDE and the EPP. Below, 
Graph 3 displays the predicted probabilities, as left-right varies and the other predictors are kept at 
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Graph 3: Comparing left-right in the West and in the East of Europe
Note: n (Old) = 56; n (New) = 37. Other variables kept at their mean-values
In general, the effect of left-right appears to be somewhat different in the two macro-regions. In the 
'Old' Europe ideological differences between the three 'core' political Groups seem more starking. 
As national parties move to the left, they are more and more likely to join the S&D Group. On the 
other hand, as they approach the right-pole of the spectrum, the probability of entering the People's 
Party becomes very large. In-between the two largest groups there is a clear space for the Liberals, 
which  are  more  likely to  be chosen by the  parties  located  towards  the  centre  of  the  left-right  
spectrum.
In the 'New' Europe, by contrast, differences are not as clear. True, the pattern is broadly similar: on 
the left, the S&D is the most likely option; on the right, the EPP becomes the preferred alternative.  
However, it  is only broadly so: the area occupied by the EPP is much broader than in Western 
Europe, and parties located on the left (by comparative standards) are also quite likely members of 
the People's Party. The picture is more 'normal' on the right – where the likelihood to enter the S&D 
becomes very small. 
Overall,  left-right does not appear to be a very powerful predictor of Group membership for the 
parties  of post-communist  Europe.  At  a  minimum, it  does not  differentiate  among the political 
Groups as neatly as it does for Western Europe. This point – crucial to assess the integration of the  
New Members in the enlarged Europe – begs further investigation. In the following section, I will  
specifically assess, informing a model only with the national party positions on some important 
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Assessing the fit of parties in the West and in the East
Model  3  includes  four  additional  policy  scales  beside  left-right  and  EU  integration:  market  
economy, welfare expansion, liberal-conservatism and  environment.  Such specification improves 
the fit of the Model (pseudo-R2) to 0.52. Its interpretation involves many comparisons and it is not 
easy. The effect of the general left-right scale is mostly captured by the other policy dimensions. For 
instance, differences between the S&D and the ALDE, as well as between the S&D and the EPP, are 
due to the members' positions on the economy. Those national parties supporting a more active role 
of  the  State  in  the  economy are  more  likely to  seek  membership  in  the  S&D,  while  the  EPP 
members are the strongest supporters of a laissez-faire economic policy.  In other cases, the effect of 
the general left-right scale is captured by liberal-conservatism. Hence, in the comparison between 
the ALDE and the EPP the scale on 'new politics' is strongly significant (p<.01) and indicates that 
the more conservative parties are more likely to get membership in the EPP. 
Model 3
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n = 140 
Log-likelihood = -120.94
Pseudo R2 = 52
In order to simplify the task of interpreting Model 3, we also estimated the predicted probabilities  
for each national party to join the seven political Groups, based on the location of the national 
parties on the six policy dimensions. By convention (see Budge et al., 1987:400-401), the highest 
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probability is taken as the predicted outcome category. Then, each prediction is confronted with the 
actual Group where the party is member, calculating a probability ratio as correctly predicted  / 
observed cases.
Overall, the model correctly predicts the transnational affiliation of 100 out of 140 parties, that is 
the 71,4%. In other words, by only knowing their position on six policy scales, we have been able to 
classify more than two parties out of three in the correct  political  Group.13 This finding nicely 
mirrors the comparable exercises in the literature: Klingemann et al. (2007) place the 68% of their 
parties (n=133) in the correct grouping, while Benoit and McElroy (2010) are able to estimate the 
correct placement of the 79% of the parties in their data-set (n=146). These overall figures can be 
further disaggregated per political Group and macro-region (Old  vs New Europe) as to provide a 
more fine-grained picture (Table 3).
The probability ratios for the political Groups vary considerably. The model predicts very well the 
member parties of the EPP and the GUE, with 80% of correct predictions, and it does also a good 
job for the ECR, the Euro-skeptics (both about 71%) and the S&D (about 69%). The lower ratio of 
correct prediction is for the ALDE, where barely one out of two parties is correctly predicted. The 
findings show that – among the three largest political Groups – the centrist ALDE has the weakest 
boundedness and its member parties are often classified as members either of the EPP or the S&D.
Moving to the comparison between Western and Eastern Europe, we would expect a stronger misfit 
for the parties of the 'New' Members. As the entries in Table 3 show, this expectation is partly 
supported by the evidence. The overall percentage of correct predictions for the post-communist 
countries  drops  by  about  20  percent,  to  58.7.  However,  both  for  the  EPP and  the  S&D,  the 
percentage of correct predictions is only slightly lower.  Both in the West and in the East, it is the 
ALDE Group with the lowest percentage of correct placements. This is hardly surprising, given the 
wide meaning of the label 'liberalism' and the traditional division within the Liberal family among 
'social'  and 'market' liberals (Von Beyme, 1985:32-46). In Eastern Europe, the 'liberal'  label has 
been further plagued by its widespread – and at times unjustified – usage in the early days of the 
democratization process. 
If what national parties declare in their election manifestos is sufficient to classify more than two-
thirds of them in the correct grouping, it is worth focusing on the misplaced observations to see if 
any pattern emerges. First, however, it shall be added that for another 13 percent of the parties (10 
in the 'Old' and 8 in the 'New' Europe) the second prediction is the correct one. Hence, only the 
13 If we apply a majority rule, predicting every national party in the modal outcome category (the EPP), we would 
obtain the 29 percent of correct predictions (EPP members / n sample)
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fifteen percent of the parties is  completely misclassified.  At this point,  some reflections on the 
misplaced parties are necessary. 
First,  we  found  before  some  evidence  on  the  importance  of  pragmatic  incentives.  The  Model 
corroborates our previous findings by predicting, for instance, the Italian Democrats as a most likely 
member of the ALDE Group. If the programmatic statements written in its Euromanifestos bring it 
closer to the ALDE position, a party with 'majoritarian vocation' knows that its influence in the 
Chamber is maximized by joining the bigger S&D.
In some other cases, 'domestic politics' is likely to have had an effect on Group choice. When more 
than one national party is a potential member of a political Group, party competition and electoral 
tactics 'at  home'  can be important.  It  has already occurred in history that a member party of a 
political Group has vetoed the candidature of another party from the same country. Membership in a 
political Group can be an important factor of legitimization – especially  for new parties in search of 
identity and recognition.14 
Third,  some  measurement  error  needs  to  be  taken  into  account.  It  is  probably  more  than  a 
coincidence that several of the wrongly classified parties issued very short Euromanifestos. As it 
has been demonstrated in the literature on party manifestos (Gabel, Huber, 2000), short documents 
provide too limited information. The computation of policy scales is problematic and the resulting 
placement of the parties inconsistent. As a first illustration of this problem, it shall be noted that the 
average length of the Euromanifestos in our sample amounts to 497', while the average for the 
wrongly-classified parties amounts to 346 and, for Eastern members, to only 174 'quasi-sentences'. 
Finally, out of the total number of parties wrongly classified in the East European region, about half 
belongs to Latvia and Lithuania. It shall be noted that the same two Baltic countries have been 
described  as  the  most  resilient  to  left-right  classifications  among  the  new  EU  members 
(Klingemann et al., 2007:15, 25). This finding is confirmed here, where it is shown that several of 
their parties are, indeed, at odds with the existing party configuration in the EP.
14 For instance, the Italian People's Party (PPI) has vetoed for several years the entry in the EPP Group of Silvio 
Berlusconi's Forza Italia (FI). Eventually, the largest and most successful FI, until then isolated in the Parliament, 
was accepted in the EPP. After some years of uneasy coexistence, the PPI left the EPP and entered the ALDE.
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Table 6.3: Classification of the national parties in the political Groups 
EPP-ED S&D ALDE GREENS GUE/NGL ECR EFD Total
N % N % N % N % N % N % N % N %
Correct 
placement
32 80 18 69.2 14 51.8 14 77.8 12 80 5 71.4 5 71.4 100 71.4
    
     - Old Europe
19 82.6 12 70.6 9 56.2 14 82.3 12 92.3 2 100 5 83.3 73 77.7
    - New Europe 13 76.6 6 66.6 5 45.4 - - - - 3 60 - - 27 58.7
Correct second 
placement 
4 10 2 7.8 7 25.9 2 11.1 2 13.3 - - 1 14.3 18 12.9
   
    - Old Europe
2 8.7 2 11.7 4 25 1 5.9 1 7.7 - - - - 10 10.6
    - New Europe 2 11.7 - - 3 27.2 1 100 1 50 - - 1 100 8 17.4
Wrong 
placement
4 10 6 23 6 22.2 2 11.1 1 6.7 2 28.6 1 14.3 22 15.7
   
    - Old Europe
2 8.7 3 17.6 3 18.7 2 11.8 - - - - 1 16.7 11 11.7
    - New Europe 2 11.7 3 33.3 3 27.2 - - 1 50 2 40 - - 11 23.9
Total 40 100 26 100 27 100 18 100 15 100 7 100 7 100 140 100
Key: Estimates from Model 3
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6. Conclusions
Using a multinomial logit model to classify national parties in the political Groups, informed 
only with their positions on some important policy scales, it has been possible to correctly predict  
the transnational affiliation of more than two national parties over three. To be sure, the possibility 
that other factors beside ideology or policy compatibility would matter for Group membership has 
not been totally ruled out. Thus, controlling for ideology, large parties are more likely to join the 
large rather than the small political Groups. Parties – and large national parties especially – are 
conditioned in their transnational affiliation by the pragmatic incentives and the office spoils that 
Group affiliation grants. Nonetheless, in the new EU-27, ideology or policy compatibility is, still,  
the  main  factor  behind  Group  membership.  In  turn,  this  means  that  the  political  Groups  are 
aggregations of like-minded parties, sharing – at a minimum – similar policy objectives. This is 
especially  remarkable  for  the  EPP and  the  S&D  which,  including  members  from  all  the  EU 
members, have been at times portrayed as mere 'catch-all' coalitions of national parties.
Our results are nicely mirrored by similar exercises in the literature (Bardi et al., 2010:10-
31; Klingemann  et al.,  2007:29-50; McElroy, Benoit, 2010) which, relying on different data and 
methods, corroborate the validity of our findings. In terms of substance, if national parties, grouping 
together  at  the  EU  level,  confront  their national voters  with  similar  manifestos,  then  citizens 
throughout the EU already have the de facto possibility to choose from European alternatives. Thus, 
in terms of programmatic supply at least, the prospects for representative democracy at the EU level 
– as the Treaty of Lisbon emphatically declares – might not be as bleak as it is often suggested.
However, a more cautious conclusion has to be drawn about the integration of the ten post-
communist countries which entered the EU between 2004 and 2007. It has been shown that the 
general left-right dimension fails to discriminate the Eastern parties among the political Groups as 
neatly as it does for Western Europe. Furthermore, the percentage of correct predictions for East 
European parties is twenty percent lower than in the West. On the one hand, these findings might 
indicate that the 'new' parties still need some time to sort themselves in the 'correct' political Group 
or,  rather,  that  they are  more  likely to  pursue  pure  office  goals.  On the  other  hand,  however, 
problems of classification might also originate from the data: the average Euromanifesto in Eastern 
Europe is considerably shorter and, consequently, more problematic for the estimates. As for party 
manifestos in general, further research on the role that election platforms have in different national 
context and for different parties would be welcomed.
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